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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 119 
Accident time: 11:10 Accident Date: 06/06/1998 
Where it occurred: Tapa Tajbig, Ward 7, 
Kabul City 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
hard 
Date record created: 12/02/2004 Date  last modified: 12/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 




At the time of the accident the demining group were working with a one man drill in two man 
teams (changing about every 30 minutes). 
An accident report was made on behalf of the UN MAC and made available in September 
1999. The following summarises its content. 
The accident occurred on agricultural land described as "medium hard". The victim had been 
a deminer for 18 months and had last attended a revision course six months before. The mine 
was identified as a PMN from fragments found at the site. 
The deminer and his partner were unable to use detectors (because they were "reading 
continuously" and so were prodding and excavating the area. Photographs of the area 
showed flat, dry, agricultural land. The victim located a PMN and reported it to his Section 
Leader" who told him to prepare a charge for its destruction. He lit the safety fuse and "rushed 
towards the safe area". As he did so he stepped into an uncleared area. A mine detonated 
and "the victim lost his right foot and got serious injuries to his left foot" at 11:10. 
The investigators found that victim and his "command group" had ignored technical and 
safety procedures. They cut the safety fuse to 50cm (rather than 100-120cm). The victim then 
waited 20 seconds to ensure that the fuse was burning normally. The investigators felt that 
this wasted time and further obliged the victim to hurry as he left the area. He ran, which was 
against "procedures". Further, the investigators thought it possible that the safety lane was 
poorly marked, so confusing the victim about where it was safe to tread. 
The Team Leader stated that the land was heavily contaminated with old food tins and so the 
detectors were reading continuously. He reported that 50cm of fuse was cut and that 250g of 
demolition charge was used, and that the charge detonated 30 seconds after the accident 
occurred. [If the victim waited 20 seconds after lighting the fuse, and it was 30 second burn, 
the charge could not have gone off 30 seconds after the accident]. He thought the victim was 
careless. 
The Section Leader stated that the victim lost his left leg below the knee and had minor 
injuries to his left foot when he "stepped over the mine in uncleared area and caused the 
explosion". 




The investigators concluded that the accident was caused by ignoring technical and safety 
procedures. The Section Leader either cut the fuse too short himself or allowed the victim to 
do so. This left the deminer with 50 seconds instead of the minimum of 100 seconds needed 
to reach a safe area without haste. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that marking of safe lanes should be clear, fuses should be 
cut long enough to avoid a need for haste and that disciplinary action should be taken against 
the Team and Section leaders. 
A sketch map of the site seemed to show that the victim deliberately crossed a 10m strip of 




Victim number: 155 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 20 minutes 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 





Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available.  
The accident report stated that the victim received first aid at the site and was taken to the 
ICRC hospital in Kabul. After one day there he was flown to Peshawar, Pakistan to another 
hospital. The investigators reported that the victim later "became mute". A letter to the 
demining group's director dated 24th June 1998 reported that the victim had been in a coma 
since he arrived at hospital. 
The initial field treatment was listed as: 
infusion Ringer Lactate 1000ml 
analgesic inj-sosagen 30mg given I.M. at 11:20 
Amp. Ampicillin 1gr I.V. 
ATS 3000 units I.M. 
The medic controlled bleeding with a tourniquet and pressure bandage, and also irrigated and 
dressed the wounds. His sketch is reproduced below. 
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The victim left for hospital at 11.23 when his pulse was recorded as 100/min, BP 135/90 
"mmHg" and Respiration 20/min. 
The victim arrived at hospital at 11:30 when his pulse was recorded at 100/min, BP at 130/90 
and Respiration at 28/min. 
He was given a general anaesthetic (ketamine IV) and a below knee amputation of his right 
leg was performed along with debridment "of all other wounds". The hospital report concluded 
with the line "he became unconscious after 14 hours" at the hospital. 
Photographs in the file showed the victim during first treatment. His right foot was missing just 
above the ankle. Lacerations to the left lower leg appeared minor and did not appear to affect 
the victim's foot. There were also lacerations on the palm of his left hand.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the Team 
Leader allowed safety procedures to be breached by using a short fuse.  
The open admission of this breach in his statement implies that he may not have been aware 
that he was breaking rules, and so may have been inadequately trained which would be a 
serious management failing. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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